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Care of the Dying:The Doctor and Euthanasia 
Robert Rizzo, PhD., and Joseph Yonder 
The quality of the doctor-
patient relationship is central in 
this discussion of the euthanasia 
problem. 
Robert Rizzo, Ph.D ., is Assist-
ant Professor in the Department 
of Religious Studies at Canis ius 
College, Buffalo , N .Y. Joseph 
Yonder teaches medical ethics at 
Trocaire College, Buffalo, N .Y. 
and is also an Inhalation Therapy 
Technician at Buffalo's Columbus 
Hospital. 
Concern for the rights and dig-
nity of the dying patient moti-
vates a number of people to urge 
the adoption of voluntary eutha-
nasia, the direct killing of the pa-
tient at his own request. For 
them, to omit artificial life-sup-
ports is not enough, though they 
regard such an omission a neces-
sary first step. Their literature 
abounds with mention of per-
sonality disintegration as a result 
of devastating illnesses and ex-
treme suffering and with pointed 
references to dehumanization and 
depersonalization of care because 
of overzealous use of technology 
without regard for the patient's 
condition and wishes. Euthanasi-
asts feel that moral and legal ac-
ceptance of voluntary euthanasia 
will protect the dignity of the pa-
tient and enhance the quality of 
terminal care. I 
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In making this point, however, 
they fail to analyze thoroughly 
what constitutes comprehensive 
terminal care and what role the 
quality of the doctor-patient re-
lationship plays in that care. The 
July-August issue of the Human-
ist carries an eloquent plea for 
"Beneficient Euthanasia," fol-
lowed by a list of distinguished 
signers.2 The articles in support 
of mercy-killing shy away from an 
analysis of the quality of the con-
temporary doctor-patient rela-
tionship and the environmental 
factors affecting that quality. For 
instance, while recognizing the 
potential of euthanasia for under-
mining the relationship, Thomas 
W. Furlow, Jr., M.D. , asserts: 
"More likely, however , the bond 
between doctor and his patient 
would be uniquely enhanced, and 
tightened, for the trust in one's 
doctor would have to be abso-
lute."3 It seems justifiable to ask 
from what sources the doctor 
draws such confidence in view of 
the fact that without an analysis 
of the contemporary scene this 
remains a gratuitous assumption. 
Witness, for example, the star-
tling increase of malpractice suits! 
If the present doctor-patient 
relationship is generally poor, it 
would be unlikely that voluntary 
euthanasia would improve the 
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quality of tenninal care. Because 
it involves the destruction of life, 
it can become the artificial short 
cut in practice to comprehensive 
terminal care by way of quick dis-
posal of the object of that care, 
leaving unreformed those eco-
nomic, psychological, social, and 
cultural factors undermining the 
relationship. On the other hand, 
if we have comprehensive care 
which embraces psychological and 
spiritual counseling, comfortable 
surroundings, powerful sedation 
and an open doctor-patient rela-
tionship, then the urgent need for 
euthanasia would fade quickly in 
view of the social and legal risks 
in institutionalizing voluntary 
euthanasia. Euthanasiasts are 
quick to discount the risk poten-
tial or the "wedge or slippery 
slope argument." But as Yale 
Kamisar well illustrates, many 
supporters would neither be sur-
prised nor distressed to see the 
practice eventually embracing 
congenital idiots, permanently in-
sane and senile dementia. 4 A 
steady progression from voluntary 
to involuntary fonus of eutha-
nasia could very well be expected. 
The underlying themes of our 
article are the doctor-patient re-
lationship and the role of the 
physician in terminal care. These 
are our reference points, to which 
we relate our discussion of eutha-
nasia and the omission of morally 
extraordinary means of preserving 
life. The purpose behind our 
method is to point up the need to 
focus on the quality of the con-
temporary doctor-patient rela-
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tionship as the key issue in ter-
minal care. The opposing sides in 
the euthanasia debate must find 
their common ground here. With 
this shared point of focus , they 
can proceed to examine the fac-
tors affecting the relationship and 
work toward necessary reforms. 
Suggested Models for the 
Doctor's Role 
The call for death with dignity 
is rooted in the growing recogni-
tion that, as Pius XII stated, "the 
doctor, in fact, has no separate or 
independent right where the pa-
tient is concerned."; On moral 
and legal grounds, this view has 
strong support. George J. Annas, 
Director for Law and Health Sci-
ences, Boston University, notes a 
consumer movement in health 
care based on "a recognition that 
individuals have certain rights as 
persons and do not abdicate or 
lose these simply by entering a 
hospital for treatment, and a 
growing public demand for the 
return of decision-making power 
regarding one's body to the pa-
tient."6 Robert M. Veatch of the 
Hastings Center discusses various 
models or ways of interpreting the 
doctor-patient relationship. There 
is the engineering model where 
the physician's role is that of "an 
applied scientist," a medical tech-
nologist without concern for moral 
issues or ethical judgments; or the 
priestly model where the doctor 
becomes a sacred figure, clothing 
his judgments with a paternalistic 
and holy aura, thereby removing 
from the patient decision-making 
responsibilities; or the collegial 
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model where trust and confidence 
are the mainstays of the relation-
ship between friends; or the con-
tractual model where "two indi-
viduals or groups are interacting 
in a way where there are obliga-
tions and expected benefits for 
both." 7 Veatch prefers the last 
model because unlike the " moral 
abdication" of the engineering 
and priestly models its shared re-
sponsibility grants the patient the 
ultimate power of decision in vital 
matters without "the uncontrolled 
and false sense of equality in the 
collegial model. " R The same con-
clusion is expressed by David 
Louisell, who sees the moralist's 
and physician's views on omission 
of artificial life-sustainers recon-
ciled in practice by the obvious 
fact that it is ultimately the pa-
tient's decision to reject what the 
physician may be legally obligat-
ed to offer as "customary medical 
practice." ') He points out that the 
professional bias operative in de-
cisions to use life-sustaining meas-
ures at all costs is due to training 
and available skills and is rein-
forced by the fear of malprac-
tice.' o 
There is no justification in 
theory or practice to speak of two 
distinct, though related, impera-
tives residing in the person of the 
physician: the medical responsi-
bility to practice energetically and 
skillfully the art of healing and 
the moral responsibility to have 
concern and respect for the per-
sonal needs and rights of his pa-
tient. " Such dualism magnifies 
the prohlem. The physician IS a 
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person who practices the art of 
healing. As man, the doctor has 
certain basic rights and respon-
sibilities. In becoming a physi-
cian, the person assumes further 
rights and responsibilities which 
are in harmony and continuity 
with those possessed as man and 
not in tension with them. These 
arise out of the special relation-
ship with the person as patient. A 
physician, just as any other per-
son in a contractual relationship, 
must respect the rights of his 
partner. As physician, the person 
has no other imperative except 
that given by virtue of the special 
relationship with the patient. 
Writing on "Ethical Problems 
in Human Experimentation," Ot-
to E. Guttentag expresses a con-
cept relevant to our analysis of 
the doctor-patient relationship in 
general. 
With reference to the rel at ion · 
ship between experimenter and ex-
perimental subject. it is the concept 
of partnership between tbe two. re-
suiting- from the fact of tlwir being-
fe llow human bei ngs. that reflects 
our basic belie f and ca nnot I", sub-
ordinat"d to any other. 'l 
The principle of partnership, 
characterized by sincerity, mutual 
trust and open communication, 
underlies the various Western 
codes, such as Nuremberg and 
Declaration of Helsinki, in their 
emphasis on t he conditions for 
voluntary informed consent. In 
our estimation, the prerequisites 
for such consent should be made 
the professional ideal, the guide-
lines which the physician strives 
to follow in the use of morally 
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extraordinary means. In this way, 
we work toward safeguarding the 
rights of the patient in the proc-
ess of dying. However, it would 
be unrealistic to believe that hu-
man rights will be protected sim-
ply by restating the moral or ethi-
cal principles or norms in regard 
to care of the sick patient and 
experimental subject. Even the 
passage of more stringent laws 
cannot assure compliance unless 
a vigorous and wide-ranging ap-
paratus is set up to monitor and 
enforce observance. This is a prac-
tical issue that needs careful but 
urgent consideration. 13 In prac-
tice, there are forces and reasons 
that make it more convenient and 
sometimes more profitable to ig-
nore compliance with basic moral 
and legal principles. 
A Complex Relationship 
On the positive side, medical 
advances have provided doctors 
with greater skills and more op-
portunities to help their patients. 
However, there are practical con-
siderations in a technological set-
ting which may influence some 
physicians to interpret their rela-
tionship with the patient in a way 
that raises a point of conflict be-
tween their vocation to heal and 
the rights of the patient. Because 
of increased technical skills and 
advanced therapies, the doctor-
patient relationship has become 
more complex. As George Annas 
remarks, "the doctor is more like-
ly to be able to help a sick pa-
tient, but ... he is apt to be more 
interested in the patient's disease 
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than in the patient as a person 
with human rights."I ~ This is 
more likely to happen if the doc-
tor is inclined to see himself pri-
marily in his technical role. But 
if treatment is directed towards 
the whole person, the needs of 
the patient must also embrace his 
rights. For one great personal 
need of the patient is to have his 
rights respected. This requires 
open lines of communication be-
tween doctor and patient. Unfor-
tunately, in our technological age, 
there often seems to be contrasts 
between our technical skills in 
communication and our lack of 
skills in the art of interpersonal 
communication. How much does 
medical training contribute to the 
development of the art? And how 
much do cultural taboos of death 
and dying affect the physician in 
communicating with the dying 
patient? These are two questions 
among many that could be asked 
about the environmental factors 
affecting the doctor-patient rela-
tionship. I.; 
By virtue of the Hippocratic 
Oath, as commonly interpreted, 
the doctor is committed to avoid 
injuring the patient, especially 
by giving a lethal dose even if 
requested, and to treat the pa-
tient "according to my ability and 
judgment." The Oath, according 
to traditional interpretation, runs 
counter to what is called eutha-
nasia or mercy killing, the direct 
administration of medicines and 
procedures to terminate life. But 
it certainly does not prevent the 
doctor from omitting or stopping 
Linacre Quarterly 
specific treatment which is fail-
ing to serve effectively the patient 
in his fight against death. Some 
call this passive euthanasia or in-
direct euthanasia to distinguish 
it from lethal procedures. In this 
age of words with multiple mean-
ings, it is better to omit the term 
euthanasia altogether because of 
the controversy that surrounds 
the practice so named. This would 
help to avoid confusion as to' the 
moral distinction between direct 
administration of a death-dealing 
procedure and the omission or 
stopping of morally extraordinary 
means. In the latter, the physi-
cian, exercising his judgment, as 
the Oath prescribes, foregoes 
measures which are doing noth-
ing more than prolonging the 
agony and dying without signifi-
cant benefit to the physical, men-
tal and spiritual well-being of the 
patient. We presume that, by the 
Oath, the physician commits him-
self to treat the patient as a whole 
person. To disregard or overlook 
the patient's wishes in the matter 
of preserving life seems to run 
counter to the Oath. In our age 
of highly sophisticated technolo-
gy, relentlessly trying to halt 
death that is reasonably expected 
from all clinical signs can result in 
a depersonalization of the doctor-
patient relationship and the 
mechanization of medical care. It 
can lead to results never intended 
by the Oath, particularly in cases 
where the patient is inadequately 
informed and his wishes not re-
spected. 
The proponents of euthanasia 
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hit a sensitive nerve when they 
point out the cruelty involved in 
sustaining a person for weeks and 
months in a continuing round of 
depersonalized and technical 
treatment without allowing the 
person to decide against such 
care. This has become a theme 
in the writings of proponents of 
legalized voluntary euthanasia. 
Though the methods they pro-
pose are not shared by us, they 
have challenging insights into the 
consequences of artificially pro-
longing terminal illness. 
There are moral and legal dif-
ferences between euthanasia and 
omission of morally extraordinary 
means. First let us concentrate 
on the moral distinction, which 
should be a primary reason for 
the legal difference. In eutha-
nasia, death is caused; in OInis-
sion, death is allowed to happen 
according to natural forces. In the 
latter, there is a withdrawal of 
artificial life-sustainers or the 
decision not to use any. The 
withdrawal of means does not 
constitute a commission in a 
moral or legal sense. For the 
moral and legal meaning of an act 
cannot be determined by the 
physical nature of the action 
alone but rather must be evaluat-
ed in the light of the agent's in-
tention, the circumstances and 
the physical nature and scope of 
the action. For example, the turn-
ing off of a respirator is certainly 
a physical action, but in the clini-
cal situation it is understood as 
an omission of a life-sustainer, 
based on the decision not to con-
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tinue the intervention in the 
natural process. In euthanasia, 
there is the decision to intervene 
further in the natural process. 
This is seen both from the physi-
cal nature and scope of the action 
and its context. It is clear, more-
over, from both the nature and 
scope of the action and its setting 
that the agent intends to kill and 
in fact does kill the patient. 
The Physical and 
Psychological Levels 
To say that the moral meanings 
of euthanasia and omission of 
morally extraordinary means are 
the same is to ignore what in fact 
is taking place on the physical and 
psychological levels. On the physi-
cal level, omission allows death as 
the result of a natural breakdown 
of the organic whole we call hu-
man life. Euthanasia is an action 
directly causing death. The psy-
chological impact of administer-
ing a lethal procedure cannot be 
readily equated with the omitting 
of artificial measures. In eutha-
nasia, the proximate goal or 
intention of the agent is the im-
mediate death of the patient. In 
omission, the proximate goal is 
the non-intervention in the natu-
ral process. The lethal procedure 
is a destructive act both in inten-
tion and in the physical order. 
Omission is not in itself destruc-
tive but rather an admission of 
the failure to help recovery or to 
ward off death, a recognition that 
artificial intervention is not serv-
ing a good purpose but rather ag-
gravating a personal ordeal. When 
we enter into an act which is of 
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its nature destructive of life, we 
should be aware that the psy-
chological consequences could be 
decidedly detrimental to all in-
volved in the perpetration of the 
deed. 
The proponents of euthanasia 
raise the question whether it is 
necessarily wrong because it is a 
form of killing. Joseph Fletcher, 
a very forthright advocate of eu-
thanasia as well as omission of 
extraordinary means, observes 
quite pointedly that "the objec-
tion that it is murder only begs 
the question, since the problem is 
precisely whether a telo de se for 
medical cause is to be held an 
unlawful killing."16 In the same 
breath, he notes that religious op-
ponents of euthanasia fail to 
realize that the decalogue forbids 
murder and not killing and that 
Jews and Christians have not been 
conspicuous as vegetarians, paci-
fists or opponents of capital 
punishment. Fletcher proposes 
the possibility that euthanasia 
poses much less a danger to social 
morals than the present military 
strategy of mass extermination 
and methods of warfareY He also 
prophesizes the day when eutha-
nasia will be as readily justified 
for "therapeutic reasons of men-
tal, emotional and social well-
being," as is abortion today.1 8 
It is quite true that killing in 
specific contexts has been tradi-
tionally justified by Jewish and 
Christian moralists. But this fact 
in itself does not mean that eu-
thanasia can be readily justified 
at this historical moment. Fletch-
er's pointed reference to our le-
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gitimatization of nuclear and con-
ventional warfare and capital 
punishment is a challenge to those 
who uphold the value of human 
life in their case against eutha-
nasia but are more flexible in 
matters of warfare, capital pun-
ishment and social injustices. 
However, the fact that acts of 
destruction have been and are 
being justified in other sectors of 
life does not warrant our ready 
acceptance of destruction in the 
care of the dying. It can be ar-
gued that we continue to avoid 
overt and covert destructive acts 
in the care of the dying, while 
we struggle to minimize, if not 
eradicate, destructive attitudes 
and acts in other realms of life 
and society. 
Serious Questions: Moral, 
Medical and Social 
Writing on "Death, Legal and 
Illegal," Daniel C. Maguire dis-
cerns changes in moral attitudes 
towards different kinds of killing. 
"Inasmuch as those shifts reflect 
a recognition that we have over-
estimated our moral right to kill 
in a military setting and under-
estimated it in some medical and 
private situations, I believe the 
shifts are in the right ethical di-
rection."19 To support his conten-
tion that the law is out of step, 
Maguire then proceeds to' ex-
amine "four classes of legal kill-
ing:" abortion, capital punish-
ment, war and suicide. We do not 
understand the "logic" of his ar-
gument, which is knitted together 
by hidden assumptions. In Ma-
guire's reasoning, there seems to 
be an assumption that we are 
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morally evolving on all fronts at 
an equal pace as evidenced by our 
more critical attitudes towards 
war and capital punishment and 
our more tolerant or more under-
standing attitude towards abO'r-
tion and suicide. This is a rather 
huge assumption in view of the 
possibility that in our personal 
and social life we may be prone to 
take a step forward in one area 
and a step back in another. As 
Maguire himself would admit, it 
is a matter of personal interpre-
tation whether each change is re-
garded a sign of moral progress or 
regression. In our view, the 
emerging critical attitude towards 
war and the military establish-
ment and towards capital punish-
ment and the penal system could 
carry the day and have a power-
fully beneficial impact in minimiz-
ing violence within our national 
and international communities. 
But this remains a hope. As re-
gards abortion, the recent Su-
preme Court ruling has opened 
the legal way to abortion on de-
mand but has not signaled the 
end to serious moral, medical and 
social questions about abortion as 
a widespread and repeated prac-
tice. As Maguire himself admits, 
the experience of countries with 
liberal abortion laws fQr fifteen 
years or mQre should be carefully 
studied to' evaluate the long-range 
effects of the practice as a sQcial 
phenQmenon. A mQre sympathetic 
attitude towards those seeking 
abO'rtion and tQwards thQse at-
tempting suicide dQes nQt IQgical-
ly cQmmit us to' accept morally or 
legally abQrtion or suicide as SQ-
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cial solutions to human problems. 
It should impel us to find ways to 
alleviate the suffering and solve 
the problems that prompt indi-
viduals to seek a solution in abor-
tion or suicide. Our problem may 
be the belief that, once we moral-
ize or legislate on a problem, we 
have coped with it adequately. 
Unfortunately moralizing and leg-
islating can leave untouched the 
roots of human problems, of 
which abortion and suicide are 
symptoms. 
What is Maguire's objective in 
illustrating shifts in attitudes? In 
his recent book, Death By Choice, 
Maguire writes in reference to the 
case of a girl born with spina 
bifida with meningomyelocele of 
the lumbar spine: 
The moral question then IS 
whether the death should be en-
trusted to the imminent disease or 
whether it could be brought on by 
the administration of drugs or 
whether a compromise could be 
found whereby the drugs are used 
to comfort and to weaken in co-
ordination with the meningitis. In 
the present state of legal and moral 
debate, the latter possibility would 
offer the advantage of protective 
ambiguity. There is no precise way 
of knowing whether a drug is ac-
celerating death as it relieves dis-
comfort, since the unrelieved dis-
comfort might accelerate death too 
and since the degree of immunity 
to the drug is a variable. Still , this 
flight to ambiguity would represent 
a retreat from the question to he 
explored in this book, viz. , can it be 
moral and should it be legal to take 
direct action to terminate life in 
certain circumstances?2U 
Maguire's answer is a definite 
"yes." The thrust of his book as 
well as articles on the issue is 
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toward the moral and legal vali-
dation of euthanasia in some 
form, We would caution that, be-
fore hazarding moral and legal 
revision of the status of eutha-
nasia, we should analyze the care 
of the dying in its total context. 
Euthanasia is a destructive act, 
no matter how it is dressed up in 
"antiseptic" terminology. Omis-
sion of morally extraordinary 
means is not in itself destructive. 
It is the cessation of artificial 
intervention upon recognition of 
the unreasonableness of striving 
to preserve life. Euthanasia is in 
fact an artificial intervention to 
terminate life. The former does 
not imply that the patient is then 
abandoned. On the contrary, the 
patient continues to be cared for. 
An example is the emphasis on 
personal care rather than on tech-
nical vigilance in St. Christopher's 
Hospice in England. Patients are 
not wrapped around a schedule 
but are allowed to feel out their 
last days with the help of staff 
and family, cheerful surround-
ings, powerful painkilling drugs 
and without the threat of cardio-
pulmonary resuscitation and oth-
er artificial life-supports.:' I In the 
case of ever increasing doses of 
powerful sedatives, death may be 
hastened. But this is the unavoid-
able side effect of the overall 
action to care for the patient in 
extreme pain. It is an effect of an 
act which is morally good both by 
reason of the agent's intention 
and by virtue of the immediate 
concrete objectives of the act as 
seen in its context. Killing the pa-
tient is neither the intended 
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means nor in fact the means to 
achieve the proximate goal, the 
relief of extreme pain. Though it 
may seem overly subtle to dis-
tinguish morally between admin-
istering drugs to kill and drugs to 
relieve pain with the concomitant 
effect of speeding up death, there 
may be some merit in holding on 
to the moral distinction. To say 
the burden of proof is on those 
who support the distinction and 
not on the euthanasiasts is (to 
quote a famous philosopher) to 
"make history walk on its head." 
It is the rationalistic fallacy to 
live in a world of ideas divorced 
from the realities of the internal 
and external environment of man. 
It is to propose an idea "come of 
age" without critically examining 
whether the theory can be re-
alistically implemented in the 
context of psychological, cultural, 
legal, social and economic factors . 
The 'Idea of Proportionality' 
While recognizing the strength 
of the traditional moral distinc-
tion between omission and com-
mission in view of psychological, 
legal and social considerations, 
Maguire weaves a skillful argu-
ment for the moral and legal ac-
ceptance of euthanasia in certain 
circumstances. His general meth-
od is to discover moral meaning 
"not just in principles but in all 
the concrete circumstances that 
constitute the reality of a person's 
situation" and to test again and 
again the validity of principles in 
empirical experience from which 
they derive. 22 More specifically, 
his method of defending death by 
choice, whether it involves one's 
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own life or the life of another, de-
pends "to an important degree on 
the idea of proportionality."23 He 
attempts to discover proportion-
ate reason for terminating life by 
engaging in the calculus of weigh-
ing values against one another in 
the concrete situation: for ex-
ample, the value of biological life 
of an irreversibly comatose patient 
or the unrelenting painful life of 
a conscious terminal patient 
against other significant values 
that would accrue to the patient 
and his family from a speedy ter-
mination of life. According to this 
calculating existential approach, 
the principles prohibiting direct 
termination are relative as only 
one of the factors to be weighed in 
the balancing of values in the con-
flict situation. In certain in-
stances, the scales tip in favor of 
values other than life and its con-
tinuation. At this point, the ques-
tion of the moral validity of the 
means is reduced to the question , 
"what means better serves the 
purpose of the act, that is, the 
achievement of the weightier 
values?" 
Maguire pursues his analysis of 
the many dimensions of eutha-
nasia much further in Death By 
Choice than in previous articles. 
He considers such aspects as the 
method of evaluating a patient's 
free decision; the fallibility of 
prognosis; cultural, social, psy-
chological and professional rea-
sons why doctors should not have 
the right to decide termination; 
the legal, social and moral diffi-
culties of terminating the life of 
an unconscious or mentally in-
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competent patient, and the gen-
eral complications arising from 
the legal system and insurance 
companies. In many respects, he 
offers valuable insights into the 
factors which make euthanasia a 
complicated personal decision and 
social question. But, in our opin-
ion, he does not go far enough in 
analyzing the problems which 
would be created by the social 
acceptance of euthanasia. Be-
cause euthanasia is a destructive 
act, its personal and social con-
sequences must be examined in 
the total context of terminal care. 
For instance, Maguire would take 
from the physician the burden of 
deciding for euthanasia. He lo-
cates the right of decision in the 
patient or in a "Committee of the 
Person," that is, a person or group 
of persons designated by the pa-
tient and appointed by the court 
to act in time of incompetence or 
to a court appointed committee 
having some relatives as mem-
bers. The physician provides in-
formation in terms of diagnosis 
and prognosis, and direction by 
his counsel. However, in the con-
text of terminal care, the exclu-
sion of the attending physician 
from the proximate decision-mak-
ing seems unrealistic. Maguire 
slides over the fact that it will be 
the physician who will have the 
emotionally charged task of kill-
ing the patient and that all 
through the illness the physician 
is the one who carries a large 
share of the burden in relating to 
the patient and family. To realize 
in practice Maguire's suggestions 
would demand a number of major 
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changes in the health care pro-
fession and system and in the law 
itself and perhaps the creation of 
a new bureaucracy to administer 
and control euthanasia. In the 
care of the dying person, the 
central issue is the quality of 
the doctor-patient relationship. 
Whatever affects that relation-
ship must be subjected to a more 
thorough evaluation than Ma-
guire undertakes in his defense of 
euthanasia. In the long run, it is 
the quality of that relationship 
which determines the quality of 
terminal care. Maguire's focus on 
the social, moral and legal accept-
ance of euthanasia is a misplaced 
emphasis which overrates the im-
portance of euthanasia for com-
prehensive terminal care. 
Charles Curran follows a simi-
lar pattern. He proposes a prac-
tical norm which allows "positive 
interference at the same moment 
in which treatments and pro-
cedures can be discontinued be-
cause they are useless."24 While 
recognizing the objection that eu-
thanasia might not be easily con-
fined to such cases, he does not 
confront directly the plethora of 
problems which euthanasia would 
raise once accepted in principle 
and in specific instances. Ironical-
ly Paul Ramsey, who strenously 
objects to euthanasia on the 
grounds of the God-given sanctity 
of human life, admits exceptions. 
We may say, never abandon care 
of the dying except when they are 
irre trievably inaccessible to human 
care. N ever hasten the dying proc· 
ess except when it is entire ly indif· 
ferent to the patient whether hi s 
dying is accomplished hy an in · 
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travenous bubble of air or by the 
withdrawal of useless ordinary nat-
ural remedies such as nourish-
ment.2S 
Two exceptional cases might be 
a patient in deep and irreversible 
coma or a patient dying in ex-
treme pain and knowing no re-
lief.26 Proposing this, Ramsey 
drops the whole matter into the 
collective lap of physicians with-
out elucidating the practical dif-
ficulties involved in making such 
decisions. 
Can the ,Risks Equal the Gain? 
The relevant question is: what 
can be accomplished by eutha-
nasia that could not be by other 
measures, and if anything is ac-
complished, are the legal and so-
cial risks proportionate to the 
gain? It seems that the omission 
of artificial life-sustainers when 
judged morally extraordinary, if 
intelligently applied, can remove 
much personal ordeal now cited 
as justification for euthanasia. 
Omission, as noted above, would 
be only one facet of comprehen-
sive care. In addition, if clinical 
death is redefined in terms of neo-
cortical death (and not total 
brain death), an hypothesis we 
explored in a previous article,2i 
it would allow physicians to cope 
with cases in which patients are 
deeply comatose because of neo-
cortical death, without having to 
justify euthanasia as a method 
and social policy in the care of the 
dying. 
There is a sound legal differ-
ence between euthanasia and 
omission of morally extraordinary 
means. According to George P. 
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Fletcher, professor of Law, eutha-
nasia corresponds to an act per-
petrating injury forbidden by law, 
while permitting falls in the legal 
category of omission. In this lat-
ter instance, legal responsibility 
can only be determined from the 
context of the relationship be-
tween doctor and patient.28 If the 
omission on the part of the doctor 
,offends the expectations and 
wishes of the patient arising justi-
fiably out of the relationship, the 
physician is liable to prosecution 
for malpractice. The omission of 
intravenous or respirator would 
be viewed legally different from a 
lethal procedure if it did not con-
tradict the wishes and expecta-
tions of the patient in the context 
of the relationship; therefore, the 
importance of open and frank 
communication between doctor 
and patient. In this, the doctor 
has a responsibility to avoid a 
conspiracy of silence or half 
truths that may lead to misunder-
standing and false hopes. As a 
profession, doctors have a great 
role in improving the social aware-
ness of current medical practice. 
They must help educate the pub-
lic before it becomes the patient. 
There already exists a well estab-
lished basis for such education. 
As Jonas B. Robitscher, psy" 
chiatrist and lawyer, notes, the 
Anglo-Saxon legal system, while 
protecting life against aggressive 
acts, recognizes the patient's right 
to refuse treatment.29 Court rul-
ings have offered some insight 
into the legal interpretation of 
the right without, however, re-
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moving all uncertainty and am-
biguity. Recent court decisions in 
Miami (1971) and Milwaukee 
(1972) have upheld the right of 
the terminally ill to refuse treat-
ment. In these cases, the patients 
were mentally competent. 
The major problem is that in 
many cases the terminally ill's 
mental processes may be imma-
ture, severly impaired or non-
existent. In 1972, New York State 
Court Justice Gerald Culkin ruled 
against the wife who refused to 
grant permission for the implanta-
tion of a new pacemaker battery 
for her 79-year old husband. De-
spite the fact that the quality of 
the patient's life was greatly un-
dermined by loss of memory and 
insufficient awareness of his con-
dition, the judge appointed the 
hospital director as the official 
guardian with the right to au-
thorize the procedure. The wis-
dom of the decision is open to 
several questions. What were the 
expectations and wishes of the 
patient before he lost mental com-
petence? If it could be shown that 
he did not expect and desire such 
morally extraordinary steps, then 
the doctor or the hospital should 
not have pursued the issue. What 
is the right of the medical and 
judicial authorities to impose a 
decision on the mentally incom-
petent patient and the next of kin 
when the remedy offers little or 
no hope of substantial benefit for 
recovery or restoration to any 
semblance of normal or tolerable 
existence? These are difficult 
questions to answer for several 
264 
reasons. It is difficult to define 
precisely what is meant by re-
covery or normal or tolerable ex-
istence.3o But, as stated above, 
there comes a time in the care Qof 
the very sick when all indications 
are that the patient's own life-
support systems have SQo deterio-
rated that artificial intervention 
offers no hope of halting the dy-
ing process or that, if it is retard-
ed for a time, the remaining 
existence will be one of very re-
stricted activity at best, excessive 
inconvenience and pain. If the pa-
tient in this condition has nQot 
indicated his wishes befQore losing 
mental competence, then the 
physician should consult the next 
of kin, if the party is judged emo-
tionally capable of coping with 
the situation. This is quite a deli-
cate matter because strQong emo-
tions are at work in the relatives. 
These can range from intense love 
to hostility or indifference with 
an admixture of guilt over real or 
imagined negligence and mistreat-
ment. The doctor's responsibility 
is to seek out the advice of the 
next of kin with prudence and 
delicacy. It would be ideal if he 
could call upon the assistance of 
a team of specialists in the art of 
counseling the dying and the next 
of kin. 
A Shared Responsibility 
There are factors which favor 
the presumption that the next of 
kin knows the patient's wishes 
better than the doctor and hos-
pital authorities. As in the case 
of the wife who has spent years 
caring for a sick husband, it seems 
Linacre Quarterly 
rather presumptuous of medical 
authorities with the aid of the 
court to impose further emotional, 
physical and economic strain on 
the patient and wife by artificial 
intervention which offers no hope 
of substantial benefit. If physi-
cians and hospital authorities of-
fered free service in such cases 
and gave emotional support dur-
ing and for a time after the or-
deal, then their decisiGn would 
appear less presumptuous. In the 
particularly difficult cases of criti-
cally ill infants and children, a 
thorough diagnosis and prognosis 
should be given the parents along 
with counseling. The decision to 
continue artificial life-supports or 
attempt life-saving procedures is 
ultimately theirs to make. In 
practice, it is a responsibility 
shared by the physician, who 
should be there to counsel and 
give emotional support. Without 
counseling and emotional sup-
port, the giving of the facts would 
be a brutally cold way of inform-
ing. In the absence of indication 
from the patient and in the face 
of uncertainty on the part of the 
relatives, the physician should 
take a greater role in making the 
decision. The criteria of judgment 
should include the awareness of 
the moral grounds for justifying 
cessation of artificial intervention 
in the best interests of the pa-
tient. Certainly a technological 
mentality that looks only to tech-
nical possibilities without con-
sideration for other aspects of 
human existence can lead to de-
personalized, though technically 
efficient, care. In such difficult 
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cases, a hospital committee, con-
sisting of members from various 
professions, might be helpful in 
easing the attending physician's 
burden of decision. However, one 
continuing obstacle is the vari-
ance in professional attitudes to-
ward the continuation of artificial 
life-sustainers in terminal care.31 
Professional consensus will be dif-
ficult to achieve if medical educa-
tion is slow to encourage budding 
physicians to think and dialogue 
on moral or ethical issues. 
A step towards professional 
consensus was made by the adop-
tion last year by the House of 
Delegates of the AMA of a report 
that, while condemning eutha-
nasia, endorses the patient's and/ 
or his immediate family's right to 
decide for the cessation of ex-
traordinary means in the light of 
"irrefutable evidence" of the im-
minence of "biological death."32 
The fact that the report needs to 
recommend explicitly communica-
tion of physician to patient and 
family suggests that at times 
there are serious breakdowns in 
communication. While the House 
of Delegates failed to endorse a 
legal form to protect the patient's 
rights, others, such as Walter 
Sackett, a Miami physician and 
state legislator, and Robert 
Veatch with lawyer colleagues 
have drafted respective proposals 
to give legal standing to the "liv-
ing will." Veatch's model law goes 
beyond the present Sackett bill 
in not only upholding the pa-
tient's right to be informed that 
treatment can be refused but also 
in recognizing that the right to 
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decide belongs to the patient or, 
in his place, to the spouse or kin 
or legally appointed agent and not 
to the physician.33 
Without exploring all the pros 
and cons on the advisability of 
such legislation, it is our opinion 
that some statute would be help-
ful in consolidating the already 
valid and widely recognized rights 
of the patient. The law should 
also acknowledge the right of the 
spouse or next of kin or legal rep-
resentative to act in behalf of the 
patient in the event of mental 
incompetence. Exercise of such a 
right might perhaps be subject to 
proper scrutiny by some impartial 
body. We feel that any statute 
which completely excludes the at-
tending physician as agent of last 
resort would be overly restrictive 
and somewhat unrealistic. Given 
the large number of nuclear fami-
lies and great mobility in our 
society, given the disparity in 
longevity within families and the 
reluctance to look ahead to death 
(witness the hesitation to make 
out wills), there may be a num-
ber of occasions when the attend-
ing physician will find himself 
alone with the mentally incom-
petent patient, facing the decision 
without family or legal repre-
sentative to consult. There may 
also be instances when next of kin 
is not emotionally capable of 
making a decision. 
Legislation Is Not the 
Total Answer 
Legislation will be helpful, but 
it will not provide a total answer 
to comprehensive care. We return 
to the crucial factor, the quality 
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of the doctor-patient relationship. 
A more personalized relationship, 
characterized by frank communi-
cation, would lessen in practice a 
number of difficulties that are 
foreseen in the application of the 
patient's right to refuse morally 
extraordinary means. Today, how-
ever, there are obstacles in the 
path of comprehensive care. We 
could cite possible areas in need 
of analysis and reform: for exam-
ple, adequacy of training in com-
prehensive care, cultural taboos 
on death and dying and their in-
fluence on the physician's manner 
of treating the dying patient, a 
shortage of physicians in general 
practice because of misguided so-
cial priorities. Before making a 
decision for euthanasia, we should 
make an honest evaluation of our-
selves and our environment. 
Conclusion 
Euthanasiasts are sensitive to 
personal injustices suffered by the 
terminally ill. But they are quick-
er to concentrate on abandoning 
well established principles than 
on examining closely social and 
cultural factors contributing in-
justice. What would be the con-
sequences of euthanasia as a 
socially accepted method in a 
technological society prone to vio-
lence, to social inequities, to 
breakdowns in interpersonal com-
munication , to shortages in 
personnel and resources, to short-
range planning based primarily 
on technical and financial rather 
than humanistic concerns? In the 
light of seven years experience at 
St. Joseph's, an English hospice 
for patients with malignant dis-
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eases and prognoses of three 
months or less, Cicely Saunders, 
M.D. , offers what we believe to be 
the better approch in our present 
context. Because Saunders' re-
marks are so relevant to our own 
evaluation, they are cited as sum-
ming up our thoughts and feel-
ings. 
I am in the happy position of not 
being able to carry out drastic life-
prolonging measures because we 
just do not have the facilities at St. 
Joseph's. Other people have made 
the decision, at a prior stage, that 
this is a patient for whom such 
procedures are not suitable or right 
or kind. This makes it very much 
easier for us than for the staff of 
a busy general ward. I think that it 
is extremely important that the de-
cision be made by a person who has 
learned all he can about the famil y, 
about the patient himself, and about 
the whole situation. The further we 
go in having special means at our 
disposal, the more important it is 
that we stop and think what we are 
doing . . .. I have had much cor-
respondence with the former chair-
man of the Euthanasia Society in 
Great Britain, and I took him 
round St. Joseph's after I had 
been working there some eighteen 
months. He came away saying, "I 
didn't know you could do it. If all 
patients died something like this. 
we could disband the Society." And 
he added. "I'd like to come and die 
in your Home." I do not believe in 
taking a deliberate step to end a 
patient's life - but then. I do not 
get asked . If you relieve a patient's 
pain and if you can make him feel 
like a wanted person, which he is. 
then you are not going to be asked 
about euthanasia .... I think that 
euthanasia is an admission of de-
feat, and a totally negative ap-
proach . One should be working to 
seE' that it is not needecl.,H 
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If we could make the environ-
ment fertile for the doctor-patient 
relationship in which open com-
munication and personalized care 
are the keynotes, then perhaps 
the moral values and principles 
discussed in our analysis of the 
patient's and doctor's rights and 
responsibilities would make more 
sense and appear more realistic. 
The principles provide realistic 
guidelines in the fertile soil of 
partnership. 
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